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Article
Constructing the Threat and the Role
of the Expert Witness: A Response to Aziz Rana's
Who Decides on Security?
WADIE E. SAID
Aziz Rana's article presents clearly the overlooked but crucial question of
"Who Decides on Security?" Namely, is determining who or what groups
constitute a threat something that we are capable of making ourselves, or must we
necessarily cede that authority to those in power-who supposedly have both the
access to knowledge and the ability to understand it-to protect us from threats we
cannot perceive? Using Rana's historical analysis as a framework, this Article
builds on his thesis to show how the wide latitude granted to the conclusions of the
Executive Branch's national security specialists in political matters has migrated
into the criminal justice system. This Article focuses on the specific example of
expert witnesses in federal criminal terrorism prosecutions and demonstrates that
courts have been overly deferential in allowing such individuals to testify as
experts. As a result, courts admit too much expert testimony of questionable
methodology and reliability against defendants charged with terrorist crimes.
This Article provides several examples of the phenomenon of deference to the
government's experts, as well as a focused critique of the practice of using experts
to win convictions in such cases.
Constructing the Threat and the Role
of the Expert Witness: A Response to Aziz Rana's
Who Decides on Security?
WADIE E. SAID*
Aziz Rana's thoughtful article asking the question of who decides on
"security"-a term that today may have been subsumed by the concept of
"national security"-provides a critical analysis of the historical and
philosophical shift in how the nation has traditionally assessed (primarily
external) threats to its well-being. What was once the province of the
democratic collective is now the exclusive domain of experts in the employ
of the executive branch. Rana's narrative of how this shift occurred,
standing as it does in contradistinction to the philosophical underpinnings
of the founding of the American republic, as well as the dominant trends
well into the Twentieth Century, represents a crucial intervention as
scholars, government officials, and the public at large continue to struggle
to make sense of the ever-expanding national security state in the decade
after September 11, 2001. His identification of the central debate as one
involving publicly understood common sense versus a more specialized
type of expertise that only highly trained actors can possess to analyze
national security is instructive in and of itself. Rana forces us to confront
the issue of whether determining who or what groups constitute a threat is
something that we are capable of making ourselves, or must we necessarily
cede that authority to those in power, who supposedly have both the access
to knowledge and the ability to understand it, to protect us from threats we
cannot perceive.
Using Rana's analysis as a framework, this paper builds on his thesis
to show how the wide latitude granted expert witnesses in federal criminal
terrorism prosecutions is overly deferential to the government's position.
As a result, courts admit too much expert testimony of questionable
methodology and reliability against defendants charged with terrorist
crimes. This Article aims to provide several examples of the phenomenon
of deference to the government's experts, as well as a focused critique of
the practice of using experts to win convictions in such cases.
As an initial matter, a pause is necessary before continuing this
response to Rana's paper. One should be mindful that, rightly or wrongly,
Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
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the threat of terrorism that society confronts is presented as foreign-based.
As a prime example of this trend, note that the State Department maintains
a list of groups officially designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
("FTOs"), and the penalty for "materially supporting" these groups can be
many years in prison.2 The government keeps no corresponding list of
domestic terrorist groups, and as a consequence there are no laws
prohibiting the provision of material support to those (non-existent)
groups. Even where American citizens have been implicated in terrorist
activity at home while unaffiliated with any particular group, there is
usually some form of "foreign" link. For example, the Somali-born man
charged with plotting to detonate a bomb during the annual Christmas tree
lighting in downtown Portland, Oregon,3 and the Army officer who killed
several of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood while supposedly under the
influence of the recently-assassinated Al-Qaeda figure, Anwar al-Awlaqi.4
Perhaps, then, assessing the threat requires a level of expertise beyond
the reach of the average American. Where once imperialist nations like
Britain and France menaced the nascent republic, today we are told that the
terrorist threat to the United States might come from marginalized fanatics
surreptitiously putting together a suitcase bomb in a basement apartment in
Karachi. Previously, the citizenry could mobilize and consider whether
Britain or France coveted territories in North America that constitute a part
of the United States, whereas making sense of the secret movements and
plans of non-state actors with few characteristics in common with the
average American seems to demand that we put our faith in the superior
knowledge of an unbiased specialist. Theoretically, there is nothing
implausible in such a stance. To take nothing away from Rana's measured
and careful criticism, that courts would defer to the expertise of executive
branch officials seems unsurprising.
Rana offers two examples of decisions involving matters of foreign
policy in which the court chose not to examine what it deemed a non-
justiciable political question, citing a lack of access to the relevant
information and the specialized knowledge necessary to distill that
2 Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Jan. 27,
2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (listing fifty groups as FTOs); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a) (2006) (creating a penalty of up to fifteen years incarceration for knowingly providing
support for terrorists). Additionally, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
maintains a lengthy list of "Specially Designated Nationals," the overwhelming majority of whom are
foreign, all of whom are alleged to be acting on behalf of foreign countries or groups, and with whom
trade and other dealings are prohibited. See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf. While not exclusively concerned with terrorist
targets, perhaps the major focus of the list is counterterrorism.
3 Colin Miner et al., Bomb Plot Foiled at Holiday Event in Portland, Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
28, 2010, at Al.
4 Jennifer Steinhauer, Authorities Faulted in Fort HoodAttack, NY. TIMES, Feb. 4,2011, at A15.
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information.5  In the post-9/11 realm, however, the discourse has
undergone a subtle shift from mere judicial deference to highlighting the
rationale behind that deference. Specifically, courts express their anxiety
about being perceived as impeding the government's efforts to protect the
public at large. This is true even when the political question doctrine does
not bar review in a terrorism-related case, and courts make clear their
respect for government officials' efforts to fight terrorism. The dynamic is
evident whether courts rule for or against the government, as even the
appearance of challenging the government's primacy in matters of national
security demands a proactive stance.
For example, in Boumediene v. Bush, where the Supreme Court struck
down the Military Commissions Act and held habeas corpus applicable to
detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, the Court noted that "[t]he law must
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those
who pose a real danger to our security. ''6 In a decision overturning the
grant of attorney's fees to a non-citizen detained by the immigration
authorities for over eighteen months on the basis of secret evidence, the
Third Circuit hinted at its rationale by stating, "[w]e are not inclined to
impede investigators in their efforts to cast out, root and branch, all
vestiges of terrorism both in our homeland and in far off lands."7 In a
series of decisions reading a specific intent requirement into the criminal
ban on providing material support to FTOs, the court in United States v. al-
Arian expressed its belief that such a requirement "does not, will not, and
should not hamper the government's anti-terrorism efforts," taking pains to
add that "it is in no way creating a safe harbor for terrorists or their
supporters to try and avoid prosecution .... , 8
5 Rana, supra note 1, at 1473 & n.187, 1474 & n.188.
6 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) ("[The Court's] opinion does not undermine the
Executive's powers as Commander in Chief On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.").
7 Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 555, 553 (3d Cir. 2001) (criticizing the district court for
"disregard[ing] the often complex determinations involved in releasing confidential counter-terrorism
intelligence into the public arena .. "). According to David Cole, Kiareldeen's attorney:
The government's principal source appears to have been Kiareldeen's ex-wife,
with whom he was in a custody dispute over their child. He offered unrebutted
testimony that she had made numerous false allegations against him in the course
of the dispute, all of which had been dismissed by local officials. But one
allegation, that he was associated with terrorists, was passed on to the FBI, and
that allegation landed him in jail on secret evidence for over 19 months.
David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 267, 267
(2001).
8 United States v. al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2004); United States v. al-
Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("This opinion in no way creates a safe harbor for
terrorists or their supporter to try and avoid prosecution ....").
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The above examples demonstrate the judiciary's desire to be perceived
as helping, as opposed to hindering, the protection of Americans by
properly discharging its adjudicative role. In this context, the issue of
deferring to the government's expertise assumes greater importance, since,
in the midst of the war on terror and the rise of a national security state, the
government has sought to expand the nature of what constitutes the threat.
This phenomenon can be observed in the government's efforts to prosecute
criminally individuals charged with terrorist crimes. In my previous
scholarship, I have explored aspects of the criminal terrorist prosecution
such as the admissibility of foreign confessions, 9 the use of informants,'
and the ban on providing material support to FTOs. 1" My research has
shown that criminal terrorism prosecutions have moved the law in the
direction of granting the government more discretion and expanding the
scope of what the law will allow when employing the war on terror
rubric. 2  The experts' role in generating this type of terrorist
exceptionalism should not be underestimated.
In fact, examination of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the ban on providing
material support to FTOs and the most important statute in the criminal
prosecution of terrorists, reveals that the government employs experts in a
dual role. First, there is the issue of the government's own designation of
particular groups. To be so designated, a group must be foreign, engage in
terrorism, and that terrorism must harm American nationals or American
national security, which is loosely defined.13 While an FTO may challenge
its designation, it can only do so under extremely limited circumstances
before the D.C. Circuit. 14 Even then, the State Department's determination
that an FTO's violence harms the United States or its nationals cannot be
reviewed.' 5 To date, there has not been one successful instance of an FTO
9 Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 IND. L.J. 1, 48 (2010).
to Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 707-11 (2010).
11 Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project andthe Supreme Court's Construction of Terrorism,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1456-58 (2011) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law Project]; Wadie E. Said, The
Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 556-58 (2011) [hereinafter
Material Support].
12 Wadie E. Said, The Message and Means of the Modern Terrorist Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2012).
' 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (defining "terrorist activity"); id. §§ 1189(a)(1), (c)(4)
(requiring the FTO to "threaten[] the security of United States nationals or the national security of the
United States"); id. § 1189(d)(2) (defining "national security" as the "national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States").
" See id. § 1189 (c)(l) ("Not later than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register of a
designation, an amended designation, or a determination in response to a petition for revocation, the
designated organization may seek judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.").
15 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Said,
Material Support, supra note 11, at 562-63.
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successfully overturning its designation. 16  The group that has come
closest, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq ("MEK" or "People's Mujahedin"), a
dissident Iranian group opposed to its country's government, has only
succeeded on two occasions in getting the D.C. Circuit to remand the issue
of designation to the State Department for a new hearing in which the
group was allowed access to a greater portion of the administrative record
against it. 17  Having failed in getting the D.C. Circuit to overturn its
designation, the MEK has mounted a public campaign to change its status,
recruiting in the process several high-profile politicians from both the
Democratic and Republican parties to take up its cause. 18 To date, the
MEK's campaign has been unsuccessful, even as reports have surfaced of
its members being trained secretly by the Department of Defense in the
United States to conduct operations against the Iranian government.19 The
specialized knowledge and expertise of the executive branch in defining
the terrorist groups most disfavored by the United States enjoys a great
deal of deference and, to date, has not been shaken by high-profile
campaigns to question the State Department's conclusions.
The government also employs experts in a second manner, beyond that
of merely designating groups. When the government accuses an individual
of violating § 2339B and the prosecution proceeds to trial, the government
usually produces an expert witness to give the jury information on an
FTO's background, methods, and beliefs. Critically, as opposed to a fact
witness, the expert provides an opinion as to how the defendant's actions
in particular further the charge of providing material support to an FTO.2 °
While this Article discusses examples of expert testimony in more depth
below, some points are worthy of note at the outset. Initially, the role of
the expert witness at trial differs from that of the behind-the-scenes
bureaucrat armed with specialized knowledge and making determinations
that courts refuse to examine, as seen in the examples Rana provides in his
study.2' While criminal defendants are precluded from challenging the
validity of an FTO's designation in their own underlying § 2339B
16 See Said, Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 11, at 1489 n.156 (citing cases in which the
D.C. Circuit upheld the designation to illustrate that this political decision has been insulated from
judicial review).
17 See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 613 F.3d 220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(remanding while leaving the designation intact); Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) v. Dep't
of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding while leaving the designation intact).
18 Scott Shane, Across Party Lines: Lobbying for Iranian Exiles on Terrorist List, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2011, at Al (describing MEK's cultivation of supporters such as Rudolph Giuliani, Howard
Dean, former CIA Directors Porter J. Goss and R. James Woolsey, among others).
19 Seymour Hersh, Our Men in Iran, NEWS DESK (Apr. 6, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/04/mek.html.20 FED. R. Evil. 702 ("[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . .
21 Rana, supra note 1, at 1468-72.
[Vol. 44:15451550 CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
CONSTRUCTING THE THREAT
prosecution, they may challenge an expert's viability to testify via a
Dauber?2 hearing. Even when courts permit the government's witness to
testify as an expert, a defendant enjoys an expansive Confrontation Clause
right to cross-examine the expert and his or her conclusions. Therefore,
the use of the expert witness at trial is not the same as the unassailable
government employee shielded by the cloak of executive political
authority, as the trial testimony is subject to a much greater scope of
challenge.
However, despite this clear distinction in the ability to question an
expert's conclusions, there are problematic aspects of such testimony in a §
2339B prosecution. First, there is a basic philosophical question as to why
background information on an FTO is necessary. Second, courts generally
allow the government's experts to testify in that capacity, despite the fact
that the shortcomings and biases of this relatively small class of experts are
relatively apparent. Courts tend to accept that, in a terrorism prosecution,
the government expert's methodology is essentially unassailable and have
generally refused to conduct searching inquiries into an expert's
qualifications as a witness. This situation raises serious questions about
the government expert's ability to carefully parse the evidence in a given
case, as an expert's biases or a lack of scholarly credentials can produce
erroneous testimony. In such situations, the traditional deference accorded
government experts in the area of national security appears to be on shaky
footing.
Turning to the first issue, it would seem that if a group is designated as
an FTO, it is designated, and learning about its violent actions can be both
irrelevant and needlessly inflammatory-the international terrorism
equivalent of the bloody shirt. Learning about the violent acts of a group
can quickly veer into prejudicial overkill, so there is a real question as to
why expert testimony is necessary in such cases. The legal standard
required for conviction under § 2339B provides an answer. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,23 the Supreme Court held that, for a conviction
under the statute to comport with the First Amendment, a defendant must
know that what he or she is providing to the group is material support and
that the recipient has been designated an FTO or has engaged in terrorist
activity.24 In so ruling, the Court expressly held that the government need
22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-97 (1993) (holding that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are the predominant method for determining whether or not an expert is qualified to
testify. In making this determination, judges can consider factors prior to the trial, such as testability,
whether the method has been subject to peer review, the known rate of error, general acceptance in the
field, as well as other applicable Rules of Evidence).
23 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
24Id. at 2717-18 ("Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of §
2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization's connection to terrorism, not specific intent to
further the organization's terrorist activities.").
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not prove a defendant had a specific intent to further the illegal goals of an
FTO.2 ' This means that a § 2339B defendant cannot make arguments
related to the motivations behind the provision of material support.: It is
immaterial whether a defendant meant to support an FTO's undisputed
humanitarian endeavors or not; if he or she knew that the material support
was going to an FTO, that is enough for the statute to pass constitutional
muster. While the Supreme Court did not touch on the same knowledge
versus specific intent in the Fifth Amendment due process context-a more
or less identical inquiry-the vast majority of lower courts that have ruled
on the issue have refused to read a specific intent requirement into the
statute.
26
However, while general background information on an FTO can be
useful, an expert's testimony can often veer into a highly prejudicial
explication of an FTO's violent actions. Depending on the nature of the
charges in a given case, the relevance of this type of testimony can be
questionable. And it is precisely this dynamic that implicates the second
concern about the government's use of expert witnesses in terrorism cases.
Namely, that their lack of certain critical qualities, such as language skills
or proper methodology in the regions they purport to know as "experts,"
impedes reaching viable conclusions. Given this situation, it is fair to
examine whether courts' qualifications of government witnesses as experts
has been an exercise in too much deference. This phenomenon is
examined by positing two examples, one of a particular expert, the other of
a particular case.
First, let us focus on Evan Kohlmann, the government's most high-
28profile,27 and perhaps most-used, expert witness. 28 The government
generally offers Kohlmann as an expert witness on al-Qaeda and affiliated
groups.29 Courts have qualified him as an expert witness in over twenty
prosecutions in the United States, and he helpfully links to some courts'
25 Id.
26 See Said, Material Support, supra note 11, at 578-82 & nn.209-29 (discussing case law that
deals with the issue of intent vs. knowledge).
27 See, e.g., Wesley Yang, The Terrorist Search Engine, NEW YORK MAG., Dec. 13, 2010
(referring to Kohlmann as "the Doogie Howser of Terrorism" and discussing Kohlmann's credentials
that lead to his certification as an expert witness in over twenty high profile terrorism prosecutions).
28 See About Evan Kohlmann: Court Testimonies, FLASHPOINT-INTEL.COM,
http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/about/11 -research-partners/8-about-evan-kohlmann.html?start=- i (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012) (listing twenty-two American prosecutions in which Kohlmann has testified as an
expert, as well as several prosecutions in various foreign courts). The other expert that the government
has called with some frequency in terrorism prosecutions is Matthew Levitt, a former State and
Treasury department official who heads the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. See Expert Biography: Matthew Levitt, WASH. INST. FOR
NEAR EAST POL'Y, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateCIO.php?CID=5 (last visited Apr. 6,
2012).
29 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 158-60 (2d Cir. 2011).
[Vol. 44:1545
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Daubert rulings reflecting that fact on his website.30 However, a closer
look at his credentials reveals knowledge gaps that cannot be easily
brushed aside. Initially, Kohlmann does not know Arabic, or any other
foreign language in which al-Qaeda purportedly communicates, and must
use a translator to make sense of the data he collects.3' In addition to being
a serious impediment not likely to be tolerated in other areas of research-
could we imagine that an expert in French dissident movements would not
know French-hiring a translator necessarily creates an employer-
employee dynamic that has the potential to skew the translator's results in
favor of an employer's views and expectations. For example, a recent
magazine profile of Kohlmann revealed that he found his most recent
translator on the website Craigslist; the position was initially for an intern,
but Kohlmann turned it into a full-time position because of the success the
two found working together.32 Consider the following exchange:
"Laith [Alkhouri-the translator] is one of the very few
people who [sic] I've managed to identify who has the
linguistic and cultural background to begin with and can
also learn the technical aspect. But Laith now knows this
stuff like I do." Alkhouri chimes in: "No, you're the
master. I'm not in the same category. 33
Beyond the obvious issue of language lurks the matter of educational
and professional background. Kohlmann has no advanced degrees in any
discipline related to the Middle East, Central Asia, or Islamic studies of
any kind; rather, he has a law degree from the University of
Pennsylvania.34 He does not have any experience as a law enforcement
officer, in the military, or as an intelligence operative. 35 He has, however,
authored a book on al-Qaeda in Europe, which was cited in the 9-11
Commission official report.a6 Is that enough to be qualified as an expert?
Kohlmann essentially tracks al-Qaeda and ideologically related groups,
30 See About Evan Kohlmann: Court Testimonies, supra note 28.
31 Yang, supra note 27.
32 Id.
33 id.
34 United States v. Kassir, No. S204 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 WL 910767, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
2009); Philip Giraldi, Terrorism Experts on Parade, ANTIWAR.COM (July 27, 2011, 11:00 PM),
http://original.antiwar.com/giraldi/2011/07/27/terrorism-experts-on-parade/.
35 Giraldi, supra note 34.36 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 467 n.37 (2004) (citing EVAN KOHLMANN, AL-QAtDA'S JIHAD IN EUROPE: THE AFGHAN-
BOSNIAN NETWORK (2004), available at http://9-1 Icommission.gov/report/91 1Report.pdt); see also
Kassir, 2009 WL 910767, at *6 ("[Kohlmann's] book about al Qaeda in Europe is cited in the 9-1i
Commission's Report.").
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mostly on the Internet, collecting and storing the data he peruses.Consider how Kohlmann describes his work and methodology:
[H]is methodology consists of gathering multiple sources
of information, including original and secondary sources,
cross-checking and juxtaposing new information against
existing information and evaluating new information to
determine whether his conclusions remain consonant with
the most reliable sources. He describes his work as a
study of the micro-history of al Qaeda and its involvement
in regional conflicts. His methodology is similar to that
employed by his peers in his field; indeed, he explained
that he works collaboratively with his peers, gathering
additional information and seeking out and receiving
comments on his own work.
38
Outside of the specific mention of al-Qaeda, the above paragraph is so
general and diffuse as to both methodology and content that it is not clear
from where the substance of his testimony derives. All we know about the
peers in his field is that he says he relies on them, but who they are and
how they might conduct their research are all undefined. There is also the
related question of how Kohlmann can determine accurate information and
reliable sources when, in most cases, he cannot read the language in which
any communications are written. Regardless, this description of his work
and methods has been enough for courts to permit him to testify as an
expert in almost all the judicial opinions ruling on the matter.39
Maxine Goodman has conducted a lengthy analysis of how courts
evaluate Kohlmann's expertise in the context of assessing Daubert
challenges to nonscientific experts.40 Borrowing Isaiah Berlin's term, she
37 Giraldi, supra note 34.
38 United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2006) (internal citations omitted).
39 E.g., United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Benkahla,
530 F.3d 300, 309 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 n.2 (D.
Conn. 2009); Kassir, 2009 WL 910767, at *4-7; United States v. Sabir, No. S4 05 Cr. 673(LAP), 2007
WL 1373184, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007); Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *18-21.
The only reported instance of Kohlmann's testimony being limited is United States v. Amawi, in
which the district court denied his proposed testimony as "not relevant to the issues in this case," and
determined that "the limited probative value of his testimony is outweighed very substantially by its
very considerable potential for unfair prejudice to the defendants." 541 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949-55 (N.D.
Ohio 2008). Kohlmann was later allowed to testify once the government further narrowed the scope of
his proposed testimony. United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
40 See Maxine D. Goodman, A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand--What's the Big Idea?: The
Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
635, 660-69 (2010) (analyzing five cases in which the government called Kohlmann as an expert).
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deems him a "hedgehog-type expert, motivated by unfaltering devotion to
one big idea," and "tend[ing] toward a single, central view of the world"
that "[h]e approaches ... with unwavering commitment."''4 She reviewed
the published judicial opinions regarding Kohlmann's expertise and
proposed testimony and characterizes his "hedgehog" view as follows:
In his expert reports, Kohlmann deftly links a particular
Arabic publication, website, or organization (typically the
one the defendant allegedly supported) to terrorist
recruitment. He then establishes the link between
recruiting terrorists and Osama Bin Laden. And then,
obviously, he links Bin Laden to the jihadist objective of
killing American nationals. In these cases, Kohlmann
repeatedly, vividly, and emphatically highlights these
connections throughout his expert reports.42
This type of testimony makes Kohlmann so valuable because in his single-
minded focus, he essentially "corroborate[s] the government's views of the
threat" posed by "global jihad.''43 Specifically, a review of the opinions
reveals that "courts routinely backtrack to prior admissibility decisions as a
means of assessing Kohlmann's reliability."" That is, once he has been
accepted as an expert in one case, that designation will almost certainly
follow in others, to the point where defendants have given up trying to
challenge his suitability as an expert.45 But the problem, according to
Goodman, is "the published Daubert opinions illustrate that courts accept
his methodology and conclusions 'hook, line, and sinker' without any real
scrutiny .... [allowing] Kohlmann to rely primarily on Internet sources
without ever having to explain to a court how he assesses the authenticity
of those sources. 'A6
A compelling example of the drawbacks associated with courts
accepting Kohlmann's methodology without rigorous scrutiny occurred
when he was asked to testify as an expert against two men charged with
participating in a plot to buy a missile intended to shoot down the plane of
41 See id. at 637-38 (applying philosopher Isaiah Berlin's fox/hedgehog dichotomy-the "fox"
"sees the gray, tending toward self-doubt about her view and always consider[s] alternative
explanations"-to expert witnesses).
42 Id. at 660 (internal citations omitted).
43 Yang, supra note 27.
4 Goodman, supra note 40, at 669.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 159 n.32 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting Kohlmann's
expert testimony in previous cases).
4 Goodman, supra note 40, at 669.
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the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations.47 The government put
Kohlmann forward as an expert on the Bangladeshi wing of a terrorist
group active in Southeast Asia. 48  Despite the fact that Kohlmann had
never written about the group or interviewed any of its members, and could
not even name the group's leader, the court qualified him as an expert
based on information he had obtained from the Internet.49 In that case, as
in others, Kohlmann's testimony drew a link between al-Qaeda and the
defendants, essentially guaranteeing a guilty verdict.50  While Kohlmann's
effectiveness as an expert witness is obvious, his technique is highly
controversial, to say the least, and has been subject to withering criticisms
by leaders in the field of terrorism studies, who have referred to his work
as "junk science. Perhaps the most damning statement on the use of
Kohlmann as an expert witness comes from Kohlmann himself. Referring
to the government, he noted "[i]f they had other options, don't you think
they would take them?,
52
While Evan Kohlmann is the most high-profile of the relatively few
government terrorism experts, the prosecution of the officers and directors
of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF")
represents perhaps the government's most high-profile terrorism case in
47 United States v. Aref, 285 Fed. Appx. 784, 789-92 (2d Cir. 2008). For an in-depth discussion
of the prosecution and its troubling reliance on an undercover informant, see Said, supra note 10, at
726-28 (discussing the role of an FBI informant in the terrorism prosecution of Yassin Aref and
Mohammed Hossain).
48 Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in Terror, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, at 20-21.
49 Id. at 21; see also Tom Mills, Evan Kohimann: The Doogie Howser of Terrorism?,
SPINWATCH.ORG (April 28, 2008), http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/74-
terror-spin/4850-evan-kohlmann-the-doogie-howser-of-terrorism.
5) See Bartosiewicz, supra note 48, at 20 ('"The Al Qaeda connection was critical,' Timimi's
defense attorney Edward MacMahon Jr. told me. 'If a jury in the US finds any connection between
your client and Osama bin Laden, you're going to get convicted. So Kohlmann provides key testimony
in the case that the US bombed an Al Qaeda terror camp in Afghanistan in 1998 and there was a
member of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the training camp. That was the connection, and when Timimi was
telling the [other defendants] to go to Pakistan, what he was really telling them was to go to Al Qaeda.
What Kohlmann really did for the prosecutors was to tie it all up in a big bow.' Timimi was found
guilty on all counts at the trial, which took place in a courtroom seven miles from the Pentagon, and
sentenced to life in prison.").
51 Yang, supra note 27 (1'I think no serious academic would ever testify in such a cavalier fashion
with such generalizations and quite frankly mumbo-jumbo-style analysis,' [Magnus Ranstorp, the
research director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College
and a widely recognized authority on terrorism] says. 'It takes about 30 seconds to spot that Kohmann
produces junk science in court."'); see also Bartosiewicz, supra note 48, at 20 ("Jessica Stem, a,
professor of public policy at Harvard University who recently published a book based on four years of
field interviews with insurgent leaders, says simply siphoning raw data from Internet chat rooms fails
to take a complex view of terrorism. 'They are reading what the terrorists say about themselves, and
there's lots of disinformation there,' she said of Kohlmann and Katz.").
52 Yang, supra note 27.
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federal court, for more than one reason.53 The HLF defendants were
charged with, and ultimately convicted of, violating § 2339B by providing
material support to the FTO Hamas via the then-largest Muslim charity in
the United States, the HLF.54 The Government's theory was that the
defendants were funding Hamas through a series of religious charities in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip known as zakat committees. 55 At trial, the
government did not try to prove that the committees laundered or
channeled money into Hamas' coffers but, rather, that through their
undisputed and unchallenged charitable good works, they served to
enhance the reputation of Hamas in the community.56  Since the
government could not link the money the HLF sent to the Middle East to
violence, its case hinged on linking Hamas to the zakat committees through
expert testimony. In a previous article, I characterized the HLF
prosecution as an example of the problematic extension of § 2339B's
"money is fungible" logic, which traditionally holds that material support
in the form of money to an FTO, even if given for undisputed humanitarian
aims, frees up money to buy weapons or plan attacks.57 In other words, the
theory underpinning the HLF prosecution did not implicate the money sent
to the Middle East as being used by Hamas to indirectly buy weapons.
58
Rather, it charged that the defendants, in donating to the zakat committees,
were enhancing Hamas' reputation and legitimacy in the eyes of the
community through their funding of the committees' charitable
endeavors. 59
The HLF prosecution stands as the prime example of the pitfalls
involved in the admission of the Government's expert witnesses, both
individually and collectively. Therefore, each individual expert witness is
analyzed in turn. To make the connection between the zakat committees
and Hamas, the district court allowed two Israeli witnesses to testify
53 United States v. EI-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 483 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Said, Material Support,
supra note 11, at 585-93 (discussing the prosecution and describing it as an example of § 2339B
liability stretched too far).
14 El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 485.
" Id. ("Zakat committees are charitable organizations to which practicing Muslims may donate a
portion of their income pursuant to their religious beliefs, but the Government charged that the
committees to which the defendants gave money were part of Hamas's social network.").
56 Said, Material Support, supra note 11, at 586.
"' Id. at 585, 588 (internal quotations omitted).
58 See id. at 586 (stating that the Government originally argued, but later retreated, from the
position that by providing the funding to the HLF, money was freed up to support terrorist activity).
'
91d. at 586. While I argued that such a theory violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process to criminal defendants, the majority of courts have disagreed. Additionally, the Supreme Court
has endorsed the theory, albeit as consistent with the First Amendment. See Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2717-18 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that that Court should interpret the
material support statute to require proof that a defendant intended to further terrorist activities); Said,
Material Support, supra note 11, at 578-82 (discussing cases which have addressed the issue of
whether specific intent is required to find material support).
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anonymously at trial.6 ° One, a military officer, testified as a fact witness
regarding the seizure of mainly documentary evidence during raids by the
Israeli army on several zakat committee offices in the West Bank.6' The
other, a legal advisor to the Israel Security Agency (the main Israeli
internal security apparatus) 62 using the name "Avi," testified as an expert
witness in an effort to demonstrate that Hamas controlled the zakat
committees.63 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, holding
that the anonymous testimony did not violate the defendants' Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights.64
Before turning to the Sixth Amendment analysis, it should be said that
allowing these particular witnesses to testify anonymously sends several
messages to the jury, all of which are potentially prejudicial. First, the jury
is told that the defendants are so dangerous that they will harm the
witnesses unless their identity is protected. Second, given the fact that one
was a military officer and the other an intelligence agent, the jury is told
that these witnesses are active participants in a war on terrorism that
demands secrecy, lest they fall victim to the terrorists' schemes. Third,
and specific to "Avi," the jury is told that the expert has specialized
knowledge about a terrorist organization that is indecipherable and/or
inaccessible to most people, and therefore should be kept secret.
Beyond these initial issues, the Fifth Circuit's Sixth Amendment
discussion dismissed the applicability of Smith v. Illinois,65 a 1968
Supreme Court decision finding reversible error where the sole
witness/participant in a drug transaction with the defendant testified
anonymously.66  Despite Smith's language that denying a defendant
information about a witness' identity "effectively. .. emasculates the right
of cross-examination itself," the Fifth Circuit found the case inapposite, as
it dealt with a contested recollection of a drug sale, as opposed to
66 67
"classified information or issues of witness safety" in the instant case.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, which came after
conducting a balancing test as mandated in Roviaro v. United States,68 and
concluded that not only were the witnesses to testify pseudonymously but
that defense counsel would not be given their names under a protective
60 United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 490 (5th Cir. 2011).
61 Id.
62 Core Values of the Israel Security Agency, ISRAEL SEC. AGENCY,
http://www.shabak.gov.ilVEnglish/about/Pages/valuseEn.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
63 El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 490.
64 Id. at 494.
65 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
66Id. at 131-32.
61 El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 491 (citing Smith, 390 U.S. at 133-34).
68 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
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order.69 The court reasoned that the witnesses' identity was classified and
that no one who actually knew the witnesses would or could be in a
position to talk about them, a point that led Jeffrey Kahn to note: "[o]n
what basis the court reached this speculative conclusion is left unstated.,
70
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit justified its holding with this conclusory
statement: "[W]hen the national security and safety concerns are balanced
against the defendants' ability to conduct meaningful cross-examination,
the scale tips in favor of maintaining the secrecy of the witnesses'
names."7 What is puzzling about the discussion is that it is too deferential
to admitting an anonymous foreign intelligence agent to testify as an expert
while relying on hearsay sources to give opinions on the evidence. While
this type of testimony may be appropriate for a closed congressional
briefing, the Fifth Circuit seemed to forget that it was ruling in a criminal
prosecution, thereby conflating the national security function of an
intelligence agent (albeit a foreign agent) with the public nature of a
criminal trial.
The testimony of the government's expert on the Hamas movement,
Dr. Matthew Levitt, also demonstrates the problem of too much deference
to expert witnesses in terrorism trials. Levitt, the Director of the Stein
Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, is a former Treasury Department official and FBI
intelligence analyst with a doctorate in law and diplomacy who testifies
frequently as an expert for the government in terrorism prosecutions.1
2
Levitt's testimony on the Hamas movement in general and the role of its
social wing was not challenged.73 However, his status as an expert
permitted damaging testimony that seemed to verge on unsupported
guesswork. In response to the defense's argument that the presence of
phone numbers of senior Hamas leaders in the defendants' personal phone
books was unremarkable and not evidence of a special relationship, Levitt
69 EI-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 491-92. The Fifth Circuit distinguished the HLF prosecution from that
of United States v. Celis, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed anonymous testimony against defendants
connected to a Colombian FTO on the theory that those witnesses would be targeted by the FTO for
appearing in court, but provided defense counsel with the witnesses' names under a protective order.
Id. (citing Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 830-32 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Critical to the Fifth Circuit's distinction was
the fact that the identity of the Israeli witnesses was classified, whereas that of the Colombian witnesses
was not. Id. at 493.
70 Jeffrey Kahn, What if the Boy Who Cried Wolf Could Testify Under a Pseudonym.. . as an
Expert Witness on Canis Lupus, CONCURRING OPINIONS BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:08 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/201 1/12/what-if-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-could-testify-
under-a-pseudonym-as-an-expert-witness-on-canis-lupushtml.
7' El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 492.
72 Matthew Levitt, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
templateC1O.php?CID=5 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
" El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 515. Despite this ruling, it should be noted that Levitt's objectivity and
credentials have been called into question outside the courtroom. See Ken Silverstein, The
Government's Man, HARPER'S, June 2012, at 58-59.
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testified that it was "personal and direct evidence of a relationship ...
[T]he fact that there are connections with so many Hamas leaders is not
coincidental, cannot be coincidental.' 74 It is one thing to be an expert on a
group and describe its historical formation and basic makeup. But in this
instance the court allowed Levitt, who does not speak Arabic and is not an
expert in Palestinian society, to offer an opinion which he was unqualified
to give.75  He was not admitted as an expert on whether Palestinian
political figures, even those of Hamas, provide their phone numbers with
regularity or otherwise make themselves available to their constituent
public. Based on his qualifications, he could not opine about how social
exchange in Palestinian society works, making his statement a startlingly
conclusive assertion without much basis behind it. The Fifth Circuit's
endorsement of his testimony demonstrates far too much deference to the
government's expert.
It bears repeating that the HLF prosecution was of defendants charged
with materially supporting an FTO by giving money to charities believed
to be controlled by the FTO. There was no dispute that the charities
provided genuine humanitarian aid to people in need, only that such
assistance boosted the reputation and prestige of the FTO in the
community. The link to violence is attenuated at best, so the court's
permissive attitude toward the government's experts and their testimony
allowed the government to repeatedly focus on the violent and destructive
side of an FTO. It is unclear whether the court was unaware or
unconcerned with the effect on the jury of the government's experts
consistently testifying about Hamas' violent activities, relevant or not.
Even when the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in
admitting the expert testimony of Steven Simon, a former National
Security Council staffer in the Clinton administration, to the effect that
Hamas threatens American interests, it held that any resulting error was
harmless, given the brevity of the testimony in what was a lengthy trial.76
It is difficult to see how testimony from a former high government official
to the effect that the defendants were harming American interests and
undermining American policy is not prejudicial taken on its own. When
considered alongside all the other types of expert testimony the jury heard
in the HLF prosecution, the Fifth Circuit's ruling becomes untenable.
After all, the stakes were incredibly high for the defendants; two
defendants received fifteen-year sentences, one a twenty-year sentence,
and the final two were given sixty-five years in prison.77
Overall, the use of expert witnesses in criminal terrorism prosecutions
74 Id.
75 Chris Hack, Salah on Trial: Expert Testifies About Hamas, DAILY SOUTHTOWN, Oct. 25, 2006.
76 El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 516.
" Id. at 490.
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reproduces, to a fair extent, the level of deference courts offer to expert
determinations in cases involving political questions. But, as the examples
described above hopefully demonstrate, even where expert witnesses are
subject to cross-examination, criminal prosecutions that touch on national
security try to frame the issue in such a narrow way as to compel the result
the government desires. From Rana's article, one can trace the origins of
this deference and see how it has migrated into areas where confrontation,
cross-examination, and challenge are supposedly of paramount concern.
But national security cases have their way of generating such results, and
we would be best served by subjecting the government's experts to a bit
more of a searching inquiry.

